SC Ruling on Maternity Benefit as Fundamental Right Opens Doors, But Norms Demand Clarity

On may 23, while delivering a historic judgement in K Umadevi v. State of Tamil Nadu (2025), the Supreme Court unequivocally declared that ‘leave and benefit due to maternity situation of a woman’ are fundamental rights. The Court linked several previous cases, international conventions, treaties, and prevalent socio-economic reality of the nation to grant ‘maternity leave as fundamental right under Art.21’. In Suchita Srivastava v. Chandigarh Administration (2009), it was noted that women’s ‘reproductive rights’ was an integral part of personal liberty and hence fell within the ambit of Article 21. 

In Umadevi, the Court added that ‘international conventions’, such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (‘UNDHR’), the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (‘CEDAW’), the International Covenant on SEC Rights, and ILO basic framework on ‘Maternity Protection’ (2000) provide for a ‘broad spectrum of reproductive rights includes maternity benefits.’ As such, maternity leaves were integral to maternity benefit and hence formed an essential part of personal liberty under Art.21 

The Court enunciated that the global community  “recognise maternity rights are at the intersection of several human rights and protected under human rights laws as well.” In one stroke of the pen, the Court conferred status of fundamental right to maternity rights and benefits. It is an exquisitely written judgment. The assured and protected maternity sabbath is not merely a guarantee of constitutionalism but a mandate of a civilised society under international framework.

In one stroke of the pen, the Court conferred status of fundamental right to maternity rights and benefits.

The most salient feature of the judgment is that the Court reminds the State its commitment to these international laws under Article 51(c) of the Constitution, especially regarding ILO’s framework (2000) on ‘maternity protection, right to proceed to freely, with dignity and assurance that right to return to same role, status and entitlements are in safe hands of employers and State’. The Court lauded the enactment of the Maternity Benefit Act, 1961 (‘MB Act’) and urged the world of work to look for guidance under its provisions as a comprehensive legal framework. It does not bar any worker who is a mother from availing maternity benefits and leaves. The Court hailed the MB Act as ‘North Star’ as “it affords women much flexibility and enable to live an autonomous life as worker and mother.”

Now that maternity benefits have been recognised as a fundamental right, it shall dawn a new era in constellations of fundamental rights. The employers cannot evade or hide behind the ambiguity of maternity laws or resource crunch or simple ignorance. 

The questions that emerge

There is also a procedural question involved in this new fundamental right of maternity benefit: Whether an aggrieved woman can directly approach directly either the Supreme Court or the High Court under the writ jurisdiction of Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution, overriding the relief structure of the MB Act? 

Similarly, another question that emerges is: whether, after the judicial acceptance of maternity right as a ‘human right’, the NHRC/SHRC shall exercise jurisdiction on these matters directly? 

The MB Act provides ‘an extraordinary relief mechanism’ wherein a labour inspector is vested with power to issue ‘orders’. This may lead to multiplicity of relief fora, hence causing confusion. The MB Act covers ‘each woman’, whether permanent/regular/FTE/contractual in any standard or non-standard forms of employment without any cap or bar. 

The relief under the MB Act already suffers from, what I call, ‘jurisdictional irony’. Just to briefly elaborate it, the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (‘ID Act’) also deals with employment disputes like non-payment of salary, termination of employment or unfair practice. But if such a dispute arises out of vindictive action of the management due to maternity conditions of women workers, it shall be dealt with under the MB Act. Now, the definition of ‘appropriate government’ is different in the ID Act and the MB Act. Hence most establishments that fall within one (Center/State) government for relief under the ID Act may not fall within the same jurisdiction under the MB Act. 

For example, ordinarily termination of a woman worker in a bank would come under the Central Government due to the ID Act. But if suddenly that woman claims that she was terminated due to maternity conditions, her petition shall now be heard in the labour department of the State Government. This multiplicity of fora already confuses a lot of aggrieved women workers and deprives them of appropriate relief due to ‘irony of jurisdictional issue.’

It is high time due thought may be given to observe ILO Maternity Protection Convention 183 in law.

But what about women in the informal sector?

The elephant in the room is ‘informal workers’. According to the Periodical Labour Force Survey, “over 70% of Indian employment is in the informal sector and the overwhelming majority of these informal workers are women (the Court itself records that “now women constitute a sizable portion of our workforce.”. How are they going to be impacted by the Umadevi judgment? 

Now if maternity rights are fundamental rights, it brings into its fold private employers of MSMEs for deliverance of this right. How will these MSMEs afford to finance the benefits, especially for those who are hired for ‘fixed short term’? 

It is high time due thought may be given to observe ILO Maternity Protection Convention 183 in law. The Court understood “concept of maternity leave is a matter of not just fair play and social justice but is also a constitutional guarantee to women whereof the State is bound to act.” In this regard, ‘universal maternity contributory corpus’ may be formed. Field experiences in enforcement of maternity laws reveal that several social-factors like stigma, taboo, fear, insecurity or illiteracy impede women workers from placing claims for maternity benefits. 

For employers, this benefit is the most un-provisioned for. This social attitude must also be re-vamped through accelerated awareness about the MB Act. The Court itself acknowledges this and calls upon ‘to bridge the gap between society and law’. 

With this judicial position that maternity benefits are fundamental rights, the Court has brought a nationwide attention to provisions of MB Act and accorded it due publicity and clarity in its implementation. But vesting women with maternity benefits in a patriarchal and lopsided labour market like India is not a question of legality. It is a mix factual matrix of socio-economic and political realities. It has to be addressed keeping in mind international best practices. Moreover as Andre Beteille, an eminent Indo-sociologist, remarked about India, ‘Laws set the path, it is society that travels upon.’ India has to traverse the path the Court has illustriously set for the cause of women at work.

Dr. Rohit Mani Tiwari is currently employed as Regional Labour Commissioner, Trivandrum.

Courtesy: The leaflet